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JAPANESE ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION
By LESF.R N. SALWIN*
O N March 31, 1947, the Japanese Diet approved "An Act Re-
lating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of
Preserving Fair Trade."' In diverse ways, its enactment repre-
sented a distinctive accomplishment of far reaching significance in
the economic deconcentration of Japan. Except for a general dired-
tive to the Japanese Government on November 6, 1945,2 calling for
submission of a legislative program to "eliminate and prevent
private monopoly and restraint of trade," no directive was ever
issued by SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers]
specifically laying down conditions to which the necessary legisla-
tion must conform. The important events directly leading to the
formulation of the law included the following: The Prime Minister
first designated nine Diet members, constituting the Supervisory
Committee of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission, a
government agency, to act as a Preparatory Commission. On
December 11, 1946, they held their first meeting with the Prime
Minister at the latter's official residence. On December 14, 1946,
certain legislative proposals were submitted for their consideration
by the Economic Stabilization Board. The latter agency had been
named to coordinate the views of the various interested Ministries
and to represent the government in its relations with SCAP on
the subject of anti-monopoly legislation. During February and
March 1947, several draft bills were transmitted for SCAP's con-
sideration. Suggestions for revision and improvement were evolved
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1. Law No. 54, Official Gazette, English Edition, No. 309, April 14,
1947.
2. SCAP IN 244, dated November 6, 1945, announces that "the Im-
perial Japanese Government will promptly present * * * its program for
the enactment of such laws as will eliminate and prevent private monopoly
and restraint of trade, undesirable interlocking directorates, undesirable in-
corporate security ownership and the segregation of banking from commerce,
industry and agriculture, and as will provide equal opportunity to firms and
individuals to compete in industry, commerce, finance and agriculture on a
democratic basis!'
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after a series of conferences between SCAP representatives, pri-
marily of the Economic and Scientific Section and Government
Section, on the one hand, and Japanese Government officials, on the
other. Various issues were intermediately presented to the Cabinet
for its approval. For example, on February 18, 1947, the Cabinet
decided that the administration of the anti-trust law should be
vested in a new and independent government establishment, instead
of forming a part of the Ministry of Justice as had originally been
planned. On March 11, 1947, as the process of legislative draftsman-
ship and revision gradually ground to a close, the Cabinet publicly
announced that the anti-trust measure would be presented to the
Diet with Cabinet and government support.
On March 22, 1947, the bill received the imprimatur of the
Emperor's seal, a formality required under the old Japanese Con-
stitution governing the proceedings of this, the last session of the
Diet before the new Constitution was to become effective on May
3, 1947. The bill was then submitted to the House of Representa-
tives. News of its introduction and imminent passage attracted con-
siderable attention in the Japanese press (Mainichi, Yomiuri, Asahi,
Nihon Keizai, etc.) and radio broadcasts. On March 22, 1947, the
Nippon Times, a daily published in the English language, com-
mented editorially that-
"* * * the proposed law has been drawn up with great care with
the help of expert advice after a long period of study * * *, and all
responsible quarters are agreed that it should be passed. * * *
* ** - * * the democratization of the nation's economic struc-
ture * * * calls for the abolition of trusts, cartels, private monopolies
and * * * restraint of competition * *. It is necessary * * * to
prevent the resurrection of great ** concentrations [which]
•* * might furnish a motivation for aggressive imperialism.
But * * * due consideration should be given to those who honest-
ly fear that the anti-trust law * * * will * * * result in a weakening
of Japanese economy. Conditions in Japan are different from coun-
tries with vast resources where * * * the most effective utilization
is * * * promoted by free competition.
Japan * * * cannot afford the luxury of competition, it is
claimed. Japan must pool all her available resources * * * under
unified control * * *. Anti-trust legislation will mean the end of
modern industrial development ir Japan and doom her to * * *
small-scale enterprises, it is feared.
The public must be assured that the anti-trust law is not aimed
against mere bigness in itself, that avoidance of wasteful duplica-
tion and economies * * * resulting from large scale operations are
not to be banned. *** the aim is merely to prevent the formation
of monopolies which could artificially curtail production, arbitrarily
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fix exorbitant prices, close the door of opportunity to aspiring
enterprisers, and unduly influence politics * * *. The public must
be convinced that * * * anti-trust legislation provides a safeguard
for economic democracy and economic freedom which adds to the
* * * profit of the nation." 3
SCAP's press release issued on March 22, 1947, stated:
"The proposed legislation provides for the establishment of a
Fair Trade Commission composed of seven members appointed by
* * * the Prime Minister. The Commission would conduct investi-
gations and public hearings prior to issuance of orders directing
cessation of acts violating the law.
Persons adversely affected by unfair trade practices could file
complaints with the Commission and have their rights protected
against predatory and unfair business practices. Alleged offenders
would have full opportunity to present evidence * * * and the right
to a review of their cases by a special panel of judges of the High
Court of Tokyo, who would have exclusive jurisdiction over all
civil and criminal litigation under the law.
The Commission would have authority to pass on applications of
companies to merge or consolidate, or to own stock in certain
limited types of subsidiaries, or to enter into international trade
agreements * * *. It would promulgate industry-wide standards
of fair competition." 4
Finally, on March 31, 1947, the last day of the parliamentary
session, after approval of the House of Representatives, the bill
passed the House of Peers and became law. On April 1, 1947,
Mainichi, one of the leading newspapers, expressed keen awareness
of the immediate issues and administrative challenge posed by the
new statute. It declared that-
"In order to democratize our economy * * * it is not enough
that the existing monopolies be broken but it should be made im-
possible for all monop6lies to be formed. The law enacted by the
session of the Diet just ended * * * is aimed precisely at such pre-
vention. * * *
Since Japan must import * * * raw materials, large-scale in-
dustrial enterprises would have to be organized, for imports entail
production of articles capable of competing on the world market,
and this can be done only by large-scale enterprising. Thus the
3. Nippon Times, March 22, 1947, p. 2.
4. SCAP's press release also quoted the writer's observation that the
antitrust measure "culminates a year's efforts to formulate effective anti-
trust legislation for Japan. * * * The present bill represents a distinctive ac-
complishment toward substantially carrying out prohibition of unreasonable
restraint of trade and protection of free competition as a part of the perma-
nent legislation of the country. [Enactment will mark] a step of far reaching
significance in establishing as part of Japan's legal system a Fair Trade Com-
mission charged with preventing resurgence of combines vested with undue
concentration of economic power." Nippon Times, March 27, 1947, p. 3.
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delicate question arises as to how to organize large-scale industries
without reviving monopolies. Efforts required in this direction
would be several times those exerted in breaking up trusts and * * *
monopoly. But unless this were achieved, no real reconstruction of
economy would be possible."
On April 12, 1947, the Nippon Times, going beyond the quali-
fied approval previously bestowed on the bill, stated categorically
that-
":* * * big business should be the first to welcome the Anti-
Monopoly Law ** *. * * *
Most of the business concerns of Japan * * * have been desig-
nated as 'restricted' companies * ** * * *
These 'restricted' concerns could not be reorganized nor could
the feeling of uncertainty be removed until it could be definitely
known * * * what sorts of business organizations would be per-
mitted. The new Anti-Monopoly Law furnishes the answer. * * *
At last * * *, there has been created a definitive legal basis
* * within whose limits business organizations may be estab-
lished on a permanent basis. Upon conforming to * * * the Anti-
Monopoly Law, heretofore 'restricted' companies can be removed
from this category * * *. New companies can be formed * * *
Japanese business can concentrate * * * on its primary activities
instead of being distracted by * * * the purely technical * * * mat-
ter of its internal organization. This Law should prove to be the
go-ahead signal * * *. * * * it should be -welcomed as an act of
liberation * * *."5
On May 3, 1947, the Oriental Economist, a monthly publica-
tion in English, pointed out that-
"The Law * * is designed to amplify * * * the spirit of the
SCAP directive demanding liquidation of the Zaibatsu ** *. Hence
it prevents not only the extreme centralization of business controls
but eliminates unreasonable restraint upon business activities and
encourages * * * competition and promotion of a sound enterprising
spirit.
What effects this law will have on the business world remains to
be seen. * * : those companies which operate contrary to the pro-
visions of this law will have to be liquidated or reorganized, prob-
ably one of the most far reaching repercussions this law is certain.
to cause. * * * many 'second' or new companies.will be incorporated.
The question is: Will these companies offer their stocks for public
subscription, or allot part * * * preferentially to their employees, or
allot pro rata * * * to shareholders of the liquidated companies? So
far as Japan is concerned, there is no precedent for this kind of
business adjustment.""
A restatement of the Japanese anti-trust law should prove of
5. Nippon Times, April 12, 1947, p. 4.
6. The Oriental Economist, Vol. XIV, No. 231, May 3, 1947, pp. 344-45.
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absorbing interest to American readers who may be impelled to
make a comparative analysis with our own Sherman, Clayton, and
Fair Trade Commission Acts. The paraphrase in the following
Appendix is, therefore, offered in the spirit of arousing and helping
in some measure to satisfy this natural curiosity.
APPENDIX
A PARAPHRASE OF JAPANESE ANTI-TRusT LEGISLATION
Adopted March 31, 1947
Law No. 54, Official Gazette, English ed., No. 309, April 14, 1947
CHAPTER I
GENERAL RULES
Article 1. General Objectives.
"This law, by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable re-
straints of trade and unfair methods of competition, by preventing excessive
concentration of power over enterprises, and by excluding undue restrictions
of production, sale, price, technology, etc., through combinations and agree-
ments, etc., and all other unreasonable restraints of business activities, aims to
promote free and fair competition, to stimulate the initiative of entrepreneurs,
to encourage business activities of enterprises, to heighten the levels of em-
ployment and national income and, thereby, to promote the democratic and
wholesome development of national economy as well as to assure the interest
of the general consumer."
Article 2. Definition of Terms.
"Entrepreneur," "competition," "unreasonable restraint of trade," "un-
due substantial disparities in bargaining power," "unfair methods of competi-
tion," are defined as follows:
Entrepreneur: Natural or juristic person which operates a commercial,
industrial, financial or other business enterprises.
Competition or competitor: Includes potential competition and potential
competitor.
Private mnowpolization: "Business activities by which an entrepreneur
individually or by combination, conspiracy, or any other manner excludes
or controls the business activities of other entrepreneurs, thereby causing,
contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any
particular field of trade."
Unreasonable restraint of trade: "Business activities by which an entre-
preneur, by contract, agreement or any other manner, in conjunction with
other entrepreneurs, mutually restricts or conducts their business activities
thereby, causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of
competition in any particular field of trade."
Substantial disparities in bargaining power: Such substantial disparities
in bargaining power, not justified on technological grounds, between an entre-
preneur with superior bargaining power, on the one hand, and his competitors,
on the other, which render private monopolization possible in any particular
field of trade because (1) business operations or materials used therein are
controlled to such an extent as to render it extremely difficult for a new
enterprise to be initiated; (2) production therein is controlled to such an
extent as to render it extremely difficult for another actually to compete; or(3) free competition is restricted to such an extent as to render private
monopolization possible.
[Vol. 32:588
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Unfair methods of competition:
(1) Arbitrary refusal to buy from or to supply other entrepreneurs with
commodities, funds, and "other economic benefits."
(2) Supplying commodities, funds and "other economic benefits" at
discriminatory prices.
(3) Supplying commodities, funds and "other economic benefits" at
unduly low prices.
(4) Unreasonably inducing or coercing competitors' customers by offer-
ing benefits or threatening disadvantages.
(5) Requiring others to trade on condition that they shall, without
good cause, refuse.to accept commodities, funds and "other economic benefits"
from a competitor.
(6) Requiring another party, being supplied with commodities, funds
or "other economic benefits," to accede to conditions which unduly restrain
its relations with (1) competitors or (2) suppliers; or (3) subject the ap-
pointment of its officers and directors to prior approval.
(7) Other methods of competition designated by the Fair Trade Com-
mission under Articles 71 and 72 as being contrary to public interest.
CHAPTER II
PRIVATE MONOPOLIZATION
UNREASONA L RESTRAINT oF TRADE
Article 3. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade and Private Monopolization
Outlawed.
Every entrepreneur is prohibited from undertaking or effecting any
restraint of trade or private monopolization.
Article 4. Concerted Activities Declared Illegal Per Se.
Certain concerted activities are declared illegal per se; e. g. price-fixing
in the form of establishing, stabilizing or enhancing prices; and restrictions
on production, markets, customers, sales, products, technology, construction
or expansion of facilities, adoption of new technology, or methods of produc-
tion.
Article 5. Control Organizations Outlawed.
Participation by any entrepreneur in any organization which undertakes
the allocation of or controls, by methods of excessive purchase or sale, the
distribution of materials or products, is prohibited.
Article 6. International Cartel Agreements.
Unless the effect on competition in any particular field of international
or domestic trade is negligible, participation in any agreement with a foreign
entrepreneur or with a domestic entrepreneur in regard to foreign trade is
prohibited, if the contract involves restrictions (1) declared illegal per se
under Article 4 (price-fixing or restrictions of production, markets, customers,
sales, products, technology, etc.) ; or (2) relate to exchange of scientific or
technological knowledge or necessary business information.
All proposed international agreements with a foreign entrepreneur or
with a domestic entrepreneur relating to foreign trade, performance of which
will continue for a considerable period of time (excepting those involving
extended installment deliveries based on a single transaction) must be sub-
mitted, on application, for the Commission's approval. Pending its determina-
tion, participation in any such agreement is prohibited for a period of thirty
(30) days after the filing of the application.
Article 7. Commission's Authority to Eliminate Restraint.
The Fair Trade Commission may order the elimination of any restraint
of trade or private monopolization by directing an entrepreneur to cease per-
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formance of certain acts, dispose of a part of its business, or adopt other
necessary corrective measures.
CHAPTER III
UNDUE SuBsTANTIAL DISPARITIES IN BARGAINING POWER
Article 8. Undue Disparities in Bargaining Power.
The Fair Trade Commission may order the elimination of substantial
disparities in bargaining power by directing an entrepreneur to dispose of a
part of its business, or to adopt other appropriate corrective measures. In
making its determination, the Commission shall give special consideration to
such factors as the following:
(1) Capital, reserves and other assets.
(2) Income, expenditures and other aspects of operation.
(3) Composition of officers and directors.
(4) Location of factories, work-yards and offices.
(5) Business facilities and equipment.
(6) Ownership of patents and other technological factors.
(7) Productive and sales capacity, etc.
(8) Sources for obtaining credit and materials, etc.
(9) Connection maintained with other entrepreneurs through investments
and other means.
(10) Comparison with competitors on points indicated in items 1 to 9,
inclusive.
CHAPTER IV
STOCKHOLDINGS, MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS, fERGERS, AND
TRANSFERS OF BusiIEss
Article 9. Holding Companies Outlawed.
Holding companies are prohibited. Such organizations are defined as
companies whose principal business is to control, by stock ownership, the
business activities of other campanies.
Article 10. Intercorporate Stock Ownership.
Except for certain limited types of subsidiaries, all non-financial cor-
porations are prohibited from acquiring voting stock in other companies.
Corporations, other than trading companies, may file applications with the
Fair Trade Commission to create or acquire a 100% owned subsidiary;
provided the proposed subsidiary stands in close relationship to the parent.
It must have a continuous close connection with the parent in regard to
supply of raw materials, semi-finished products, necessary parts, by-products,
waste material, "goods or other economic benefits necessary for its business
activities," or utilization of patents. The subsidiary cannot, in turn, own
stocks in a third company.
Certain additional standards must also be met before a company may
acquire less than 100% of the stock of an existing concern. These are
limited to the situation where the selling company needs to finance itself
by the issuance of stock, other methods of acquiring capital being practically
difficult. Stock in the selling company cannot be owned by a competitor of
the applicant; the proposed subsidiary cannot own stocks in a third com-
pany; and in case it is a trading company, its stocks cannot be held by any
other company than the applicant.
The Commission is authorized to approve applications to acquire stocks
of another company where the foregoing conditions are fulfilled, provided
the purchase does not constitute a substantial restriction of competition in
any particular field of trade.
[Vol. ;32:588
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Article 11. Intercorporate Stock Own;ership by Financial Institutions.
Banks and other financial institutions cannot own the stocks of com-
peting institutions that operate in the same field of financial enterprise.
Financial institutions with assets exceeding Y5,000,000 cannot acquire more
than five (5) per cent of the total issued stocks of any company.
The following exceptions are made to the foregoing limitations upon
financial institutions acquiring stocks in other corporations:
1. Securities dealers in the normal course of their business.
2. Underwriters (other than securities dealers) for purposes of public
sale.
3. Securities trusts where the cestui que trust is the beneficiary and re-
tains voting rights in the stocks deposited.
Securities dealers and underwriters may hold corporate stocks for a
period of one (1) year. Beyond that time, they must obtain the approval of
the Fair Trade Commission.
Article 12. Intercorporate Ownership of Debentures.
Intercorporate ownership of debentures (excluding bank financing de-
bentures) in excess of twenty-five (25) per cent of the capital of any given
issuing company is prohibited. The same exceptions are made in favor of
securities dealers, underwriters, and securities trusts as exist under Article
11 in regard to corporate stocks.
Article 13. Multiple Directorships.
No officer, director, or regular employee of a corporation shall hold any
executive office in a competing company or in a non-competing company
where one-fourth of the officers or directors of either company hold executive
positions in third companies. No person may hold more than three (3) offices
or directorships.
Article 14. Limitations on Individual Ownership of Stock.
No person may own stock in competing companies where the effect is
substantially to restrict competition in any particular field of trade. No person
may own more than ten (10) per cent of the issued stock of two (2) or more
companies without applying to and obtaining the approval of the Fair Trade
Commission. No officer of a corporation may invest in or otherwise acquire
the stocks of a competing company. Upon assuming office, an officer must
report to the Commission any stocks then owned by him in competing com-
panies. The Commission may order disposal of the whole or any part of such
stocks or take other necessary action, where such ownership is considered
conducive to restraint of competition.
Article 15. Mergers.
Every merger must be approved, upon the filing of an application, by
the Fair Trade Commission after a determination that certain stipulated
conditions are satisfied; e.g., restraint of competition will not result; and
the merger was not dictated by unfair methods of competition; will not bring
about substantial disparities of bargaining power; and will contribute to
rationalization of production, supply or management
Article 16. Acquisition of the Business of Another Company.
The Fair Trade Commission must approve, after the. filing of an appli-
cation, and upon the same conditions as are applicable to corporate mergers,
transfers of the whole or any part of the business of another concern, the
lease of the whole of another business enterprise, the entrustment of the
management of one company with another, or the execution of a contract for
a joint profit and loss account with another company.
Article 17. Evasions Prohibited.
Evasionary acts, in whatever form, designed to circumvent Articles 9 to
16, inclusive, are prohibited.
1948]
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Article 18. Suits Against Holding Companies and Unauthorized Mergers.
The Fair Trade Commission is authorized to institute legal action (un-
der the Civil Litigation Law) to nullify unauthorized mergers and prohibited
holding companies.
CHAPTER V
UNFAIR MrTHODS OF COMPETITION
Article 19. Unfair Methods of Competition Outlawed.
Every entrepreneur is prohibited from engaging in unfair methods of
competition.
Article 20. Commission s Remedial Authority.
In accordance with procedure outlined in Chapter VIII (public hearings,
etc.), the Fair Trade Commission may order an entrepreneur to cease and
desist from participation in any unfair method of competition.
CHAPTER VI
EXEMPTIONS
Article 21. Natural Mowpolies.
The law does not apply to business enterprises which, by their intrinsic
nature constitute natural monopolies, such as railroads, gas and electric power
plants, and other similar enterprises.
Article 22. Business Enterprises Governed by Special Laws.
The law is inapplicable to the legitimate acts of an entrepreneur per-
formed in accordance with the terms of any special law particularly governing
the conduct of its business. A list of such special laws will be designated by
special law.
Article 23. Patents, Trade-Marks, etc.
The law does not apply to acts recognized as proper and within an
entrepreneur's rights under the copyright, patent, model utility, design and
trade-mark laws.
Article 24. Associations and Cooperatives.
This law is not applicable to an association, cooperative, or federation
of associations, organized under special law which meets the following over-
all conditions:
(1) Its purpose is mutual-aid among small-scale entrepreneurs or con-
sumers.
(2) Participation or withdrawal of members is free and voluntary.
(3) Members have equal voting rights.
(4) Distribution of profits, if any, to members is in accordance with
rules laid down by law, order and/or the articles of association.
The foregoing exemption is rendered inapplicable if the association,
cooperative, or federation, employs unfair methods of competition or restrains
competition in any particular field of trade to such an extent as to cause an
undue enhancement in price.
CHAPTER VII
INDEMNIFICATION OF DAMAGES
Article 25. Liability for Civil Damages.
Any entrepreneur violating the law shall be liable for civil damages to
any injured party affected by private monopolization, unreasonable restraining
of trade, or unfair methods of competition. The absence of willfulness or negli-
gence on the part of the violator shall not constitute a valid defense.
[Vol. 32:588
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Article 26. Limitation of Civil Action.
An injured party cannot sue for private damages until the Fair Trade
Commission has rendered a decision that a violation exists under Articles 48
and 52, and its order has become final and conclusive. His right to action
expires three (3) years from the date that such decision becomes final.
CHAPTER VIII
FAIR TRADE CoMMIssION
Section 1. Organization and Power
Article 27. Establishment of Fair Trade Comnission.
Administration of the law is entrusted to a Fair Trade Commission es-
tablished under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister.
Article 28. Commission as an Independent Body.
The Commissioners shall perform their functions "independently"
Article 29. Appointment of Commissioners.
The Fair Trade Commission shall consist of seven (7) members, at
least thirty-five (35) years of age, qualified as persons of learning and
experience in law or economics, appointed by the Prime Minister with the
consent of the House of Representatives. They shall be civil service officials.
Article 30. Term of Office.
The term of office of a Commissioner shall be five (5) years; he shall
be eligible for reappointment, but must retire upon reaching the age of
sixty-five (65). A Commissioner appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve the
remaining portion of his predecessor's term of office. Separate order shall
provide such contingencies as a Commissioner completing his term of office,
or a vacancy occurring when the Diet is in recess or the House of Repre-
sentatives is dissolved.
Article 31. Removal from Office.
A Commissioner may be removed from office only on the following
grounds:
(1) He has been declared illegally incompetent or quasi-incompetent.
(2) Judgment has been rendered dismissing him from the civil service.
(3) He has been sentenced for violating this law.
(4) He has committed a crime and been sentenced to imprisonment or
heavier criminal penalty.
(5) The Fair Trade Commission has determined that he is not capable
of discharging his functions because of physical or mental dis-
abilities.
Article 32. Removals by Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister shall remove a Commissioner from office for the
causes specified in Article 31, except only dismissal from the civil service
after issuance of a judgment to that effect.
Article 33. Appointment of a Chairman.
The Prime Minister shall appoint a Chairman from among the Com-
missioners who shall preside over the affairs of the Fair Trade Commis-
sion and "represent" it. The Commissioners shall designate a Chairman from
among themselves to act in place of the Chairman in the event of his in-
capacity.
Article 34. Quorum.
Meetings cannot be held nor decisions rendered without the attendance
of the Chairman and at least three (3) Commissioners. Proceedings of the
Commission shall be governed by majority vote. In case of a tie, the Chair-
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man may cast the deciding ballot; provided, however, that the Commission
shall not remove a member from office under Article 31, on the ground of
his physical or mental disability, except with the unanimous concurrence of
all of the Commissioners except the one subject to removal.
Article 35. Necessary Personnel.
The Fair Trade Commission is authorized to establish a "staff office"
and to hire necessary personnel in order to maintain it. Such personnel, who
shall be civil service officials, shall include, among others, public prosecutors,
practicing attorneys, and those qualified to become attorneys. The duties
and responsibilities of public prosecutors (assigned by the Procurator General
to work with the Fair Trade Commission) shall be restricted to the prosecu-
tion of criminal offenses under the law.
Article 36. Compensation.
Compensation of the Chairman, other Commissioners, and staff person-
nel shall be prescribed by separate order. The emoluments of the Chairman
and other Commissioners shall not be reduced in amount during their tenure
of office.
Article 37. Outside Activities Prohibited.
The Chairman, Commissioners, and such personnel as shall be named
by separate order shall be prohibited from:
(1) Actively engaging in politics, or becoming a member of the Diet
or any local public body.
(2) Performing any other remunerative work, except with the consent
of the Prime Minister.
(3) Engaging in commerce or any other gainful occupation.
Article 38. Informal Rulings Prohibited.
Commissioners and staff personnel named by separate order are pro-
hibited from issuing interpretations or expressing their own views as to the
facts or applicability of the law to a given case, except as provided in the
law (e. g. official decisions of the Commission), or any conclusions reached
in critical studies of the law published by the Commission.
Article 39. Non-Disclosure of Trade Secrets.
The Commissioners and staff personnel, as well as former officials and
employees, are prohibited from divulging or making surreptitious use of
trade secrets acquired in the course of their official duties.
Article 40. Subpoena Powers.
The Fair Trade Commission is authorized to order any person or
representative of any organization or government office to appear before it
and produce necessary reports, information or data relevant to the proper
performance of its duties under the law.
Article 41. Compilation of Data by Outside Ageixies.
Wherever necessary to the proper performance of its functions, the
Commission may entrust and delegate to any educational institution, govern-
ment office, person of learning and experience, etc., the task of compiling
necessary reports or research.
Article 42. Information through Public Hearings.
Wherever relevant to the performance of its functions, the Fair Trade
Commission may order public hearings to be held for the purpose of receiving
the views of the general public on any necessary matters.
Article 43. Publication of Data.
Wherever the Commission deems it conducive to the proper administra-
tion of the law, it may order "necessary matters" to be made public. This,
however, does not authorize the disclosure of an entrepreneur's trade secrets.
[V9ol. ;32:58
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Article 44. Reports to the Diet.
The Fair Trade Commission shall submit, through the Prime Minister,
annual reports to the Diet covering the administration and enforcement of the
law. It may also submit, through the Prime Minister, its views and recom-
mendations in regard to matters related to achieving the purpose of the law.
Section 2. Procedure
Article 45. Receipt of Complaints.
Any person may report alleged violations to the Commission and re-
quest the facts to be investigated. Upon receipt of such information, or upon
its own initiative, whenever it considers a violation to exist the Fair Trade
Commission may conduct investigations or take other suitable measures.
Article 46. Investigatory Powers.
In conducting an investigation, the Fair Trade Commission, through
staff personnel named by separate order and specially authorized for that
purpose, may:
(1) Summon, question and require the submission of reports by wit-
nesses and "persons connected with the case."
(2) Summon specialists and require their expert testimony.
(3) Order the submission and retention of accounting books, documents
and other matter.
(4) Conduct spot investigations of business operations and establish-
ments and accounting books maintained by "persons connected with
the case."
Personnel authorized to conduct spot investigations shall be required to
carry a warrant with them.
Article 47. Records of Investigations.
After an investigation is completed, the Commission shall keep a record
showing the gist of the case and setting forth the result of any steps taken
under Article 46.
Article 48. Consent Orders.
The Fair Trade Commission may recommend to an entrepreneur the
adoption of certain measures in order to eliminate private monopolization,
unreasonable restraint of trade, unfair methods of competition, or substantial
disparities in bargaining power. The party involved shall notify the Com-
mission whether or not it accepts the recommendation. If it is accepted, the
Commission may enter an order based on the recommendation without
resorting to a formal hearing.
Article 49. Institution of Formal Hearings.
The Fair Trade Commission may initiate proceedings to have a formal
hearing held with respect to violations involving private monopolization, un-
reasonable restraint of trade, substantial disparities in bargaining power, and
unfair methods of competition. "The procedure of a hearing" commences from
the moment a notice is sent to the entrepreneur informing him of the deci-
sion to open proceedings of a hearing."
Article 50. Service of Notice.
The notice requiring an alleged violator to appear at a formal hearing
must set forth the charges and essential points of the case, together with the
date and place of hearing. The hearing must be held not less than thirty (30)
days after date of service.
Article 51. Filing of Answer.
Upon receipt of notice, a reply shall be filed by the alleged violator with-
out delay.
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Article 52. Presentation of Evidence.
The alleged violator, or his agent, may introduce supporting evidence to
substantiate reasons set forth by him why a proposed order under Articles 7,
8, or 20 would be improper; cross-examine witnesses offered by the Com-
mission; demand the interrogation of necessary witnesses by the Commission;
and cause expert testimony to be taken; accounting books and other data
in the possession of third parties to be submitted; spot investigations to be
conducted; and business operations, property, accounting books or other
matters to be examined. The defendant may appoint an attorney or other
person to act as his agent.
Article 53. Public Hearings.
Hearings shall be open to the public, unless closed sessions are deemed
necessary in the public interest, or in order to protect trade secrets. A
stenographic record shall be made of all testimony and statements produced
at the hearings.
Article 54. Decisions.
After the completion of a hearing, the Fair Trade Commission shall
incorporate its findings that a violation exists in a formal decision ordering
corrective measures under Articles 7, 8 or 20.
Article 55. Decision by Majority Vote.
Decisions shall be made by majority vote of the Commissioners taken
at a meeting of the Chairman and at least three (3) other members. The
Chairman may cast the deciding ballot in case of a tie vote.
Article 56. Meetings of the Commission.
Meetings of the Fair Trade Commission shall not be open to the public.
Article 57. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Decisions shall be in writing and incorporate findings of fact and con-
clusions of law applicable thereto. A minority opinion may be filed.
Article 58. Effective Date of Decisions.
Decisions take effect from the moment copies are served on the defendant.
Article 59. Intervention of Interested Third Parties.
The Fair Trade Commission may require or authorize a third party
interested in the result of a case to participate as a "concerned party." The
Commission shall, however, first interrogate the defendant and the interested
party before permitting the latter to intervene.
Article 60. Intervention of Government Offlces.
If deemed to be in the public interest, any interested government office
or public organization may participate in the hearing as a "concerned party."
Article 61. Expression of Views by Government Offices.
In order to protect the public interest, any government office or public
organization may express its views in regard to a case, without formal
intervention as a party to the proceedings.
Article 62. Stay Bonds.
A defendant found guilty of violating the law may suspend execution
of the Commission's 'order by depositing a bond or other security in an
amount to be fixed by the High Court of Tokyo. Applications in regard to
the filing of stay bonds shall be governed by the Simplified Litigation Pro-
cedure Law.
Article 63. Forfeiture of Stay Bonds.
The High Court of Tokyo may order the confiscation of the whole or
any part of a stay bond or other posted security after the Commission's
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order has become final and conclusive (e.g., by affirmance in the High
Court of Tokyo or the Supreme Court). Proceedings in regard to forfeiture
of stay bonds shall be governed by the Simplified Litigation Procedure Law.
Article 64. Supplementary Investigations.
Where deemed necessary in special cases, the Commission may conduct
supplementary investigations, under Article 46, subsequent to the rendition
of its decision.
Article 65. Disapproval of Applications.
When an application is filed under Articles 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 or 16 to
approve (1) participation in an international cartel agreement or an agree-
ment between domestic entrepreneurs relating to foreign trade; (2) acquisi-
tion of stocks or debentures by financial institutions or other companies; (3)
individual purchases of more than ten (10) per cent of the stocks of two(2) or more competing com panies; (4) corporate mergers; or, (5) transfer
or lease of another company's business, or the establishment 'of a joint profit
and loss account with another company, the Fair Trade Commission shall
inquire and conduct necessary investigations into the facts of the given case.
If considered to be without merit, the Commission shall issue a decision dis-
missing the application.
Article 66. Revocation of Approval.
Approval of applications required to be filed under Articles 6, 10, 11, 12,
14, 15 and 16 may be revoked by decision of the Fair Trade Commission,
after a formal hearing held for that purpose, where circumstances justifying
the original action have changed or ceased to exist.
'All decisions of the Commission may be revoked, after a formal hearing
held for that purpose, where their continuance in effect would be unreason-
able and contrary to the public interest, because the facts justifying the
original action taken have altered or no longer exist due to changed economic
or other conditions.
Article 67. Temporary Restraining Orders.
The High Court of Tokyo may, upon petition of the Fair Trade Com-
mission, issue a temporary restraining order in case of urgent necessity, direct-
ing an alleged violator to cease any act of private monopolization, unreason-
able restraint of trade, or unfair method of competition. Proceedings in regard
to the issuance, modification or revision of such temporary restraining orders
shall be governed by the Simplified Litigation Procedure Law.
Article 68. Stay of Temporary Restraining Orders.
A temporary restraining order may be stayed upon the posting of a
bond or other security in an amount to be fixed by the High Court of Tokyo.
When the decision of the Fair Trade Commission determining that a viola-
tion exists becomes final and conclusive, the Court may order the bond
or other posted security to be confiscated.
Article 69. Records of Case Open to Public.
Any interested person may have access to the records of a given case
for the purpose of examining or copying them, and may obtain a copy of the
formal decision.
Article 70. Procedural Regulations Authorized.
Procedural regulations relating to investigations, hearings, and other
action necessary to the disposition of cases, as well as the posting of stay
bonds or other security, shall be prescribed by separate order.
Section 3. Miscellaneous Provisions
Article 71. Designation of Unfair Methods of Competition.
The Fair Trade Commission shall promulgate industry-wide standards
of fair competition and designate unfair methods of competition after holding
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public hearings at which interested industry representatives and members
of the general public may attend and express their views. Proposed standards
shall first be published in tentative form, and before finally adopting them,
the Commission shall give due consideration to any objections received.
Article 72. Publication of Standards of Fair Competition.
Standards of fair competition and methods of unfair competition desig-
nated by the Fair Trade Conmission shall become effective thirty (30) days
after the giving of public notice.
Article 73. Criminal Prosecutions.
By the filing of an accusation with the Public Procurator General, the
Fair Trade Commission may request criminal proceedings to be instituted
whenever it believes that the criminal provisions of the statute have been
infringed. If the Public Procurator General refuses to prosecute, he shall
promptly submit a written report, through the Minister of Justice, to the
Prime Minister, setting forth his refusal and supporting reasons therefor.
Article 74. Criminal Investigations Requested by Public Procurator General.
The Public Procurator General may call upon the Fair Trade Commis-
sion to investigate and .report on any case where he believes a criminal viola-
tion of the statute exists.
Article 75. Compensation of Witnesses.
Provision shall be made by separate order for the traveling expenses
and other compensation of witnesses and experts summoned under Article
46 to appear and offer testimony at formal hearings.
Article 76. Procedural Regulations.
The Fair Trade Commission is authorized to issue regulations covering




Article 77. Review Proceedings in the High Court of Tokyo.
Within a period of thirty (30) days after the decision of the Fair Trade
Commission becomes effective, any party may institute suit against the Com-
mission in the High Court of Tokyo to revoke or modify its order.
Article 78. Transcript of the Record. a
Upon the filing of suit against the Fair Trade Commission, the High
Court of Tokyo shall without delay require the Commission to submit a
complete transcript of the records and evidence in the case, including the
testimony of 'all of the parties, witnesses and experts, together with any other
matter that would qualify as evidence in court.
Article 79. No Automatic Suspension of Decision under Review.
The execution of the decision of the Fair Trade Commission shall not
be suspended by the filing of a suit in the High Court of Tokyo under Article
77. Upon application of the plaintiff, or upon its own motion, the Court, may,
however, order such suspension. The Court may at any time revoke or
modify the order of suspension.
Article 80. Findings of Fact Binding on the Court.
Findings of fact made by the Fair Trade Commission, where supported
by substantial evidence, shall be binding upon the High Court of Tokyo.
The Court shall determine whether or not such substantial evidence exists
in the record.
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Article 81. Applications to Introduce New or Additional Evidence.
Any party may apply to the Court for leave to introduce new evidence
relevant to the case where it affirmatively demonstrates that:
(1) The Fair Trade Commission without good cause excluded or failed
to take cognizance of such evidence; or
(2) It was impossible to submit such evidence to the Commission due
to no negligence on the part of the applicant.
If the application shall be approved, the Court shall return the case to the
Commission with directions to receive said evidence and take such further
proceedings as may be appropriate.
Article 82. Reversal or Modification of Commission Orders.
The Court may reverse the decision of the Fair Trade Commission
where (1) findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence; or(2) it is contrary to the Constitution or other law. 'The Court may make
necessary modifications in the decision where its contents include errors of
law predicated on an arbitrary or unreasonable application of the Constitu-
tion or other law.
Article 83. Modifications by the Commission.
The Court may return a case to the Fair Trade Commission with direc-
tions to make such particular modifications in its decision as may be neces-
sary or appropriate.
Article 84. Commission's Views in Private Damage Suits.
When a suit for private damages is filed by an injured party under
Article 25, the High Court of Tokyo shall promptly call upon the Commission
for its opinion as to the amount of damages caused by the violation in
question.
Article 85. Exclusive Jurisdiction of the High Court of Tokyo.
The High Court of Tokyo shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
suits involving decisions of the Fair Trade Commission, claims for private
damages under Article 25, and criminal prosecutions under Articles 89 and
90.
Article 86. Additional Jurisdiction of the High Court of Tokyo.
The High Court of Tokyo shall have exclusive jurisdiction over (1)
the filing and forfeiture of bonds or other security staying the execution of
decisions of the Commission under Articles 62 and 63; (2) the issuance of
orders under Article 67 restraining an alleged violator pending the decision
of the Commission; and (3) the levying of non-criminal fines under Article
97 for violations of Commission orders.
Article 87. Special Patel of Antitrust Judges.
A special panel of five (5) judges shall be established within the High
Court of Tokyo to execute the original and exclusive jurisdiction vested
in it by Articles 85 and 86.
Article 88. Appeals to the Supreme Court.
No appeal shall lie from the judgment of the High Court of Tokyo to
the Supreme Court except on the following grounds: (1) that the judgment
was contrary to law; or (2) involved an unreasonable determination in
regard to a law, order, regulation or disposition affecting the case being in
conformity with the Constitution.
CHAPTER X
PENALTIES
Irticles 89 to 100.
Provision is made for fines and imprisonment ranging in amount from
YS00 to 50,000 and from six (6) months to three (3) years, respectively.
Article 95 provides for dual liability of a corporation and its responsible
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employees or representatives. At the time a verdict of guilty is rendered, the
Court may, under Article 100, order the revocation of a patent or patent
license belonging to the offender, and also prohibit the latter from participat-
ing in government contracts for a period of six (6) months to three (3) years.
SUPPLE ENTARY PaovIsIoNs
Article 101. Effective Data of the Law.
Each article of the law shall become effective and enforceable on the
particular date fixed for it by separate order.
Article 102. Applicability of Existing Contracts.
Provisions of the statute invalidating certain types of agreements apply
to contracts existing on the date when such provisions go into effect.
Article 103. Enterprise, Reconstruction and Reorganization Act.
Acts performed pursuant to reorganization plans adopted in conformity
with the Enterprise and Reorganization Act or Financial Institutions Recon-
struction and Reorganization Act shall be exempt from the provisions of
this law.
Article 104. Corrective Measures Against Control Organications.
Separate orders shall provide for corrective measures to be adopted
against existing organizations which contravene the provisions of Article 5
prohibiting controlled distribution and allocation of materials or products
by methods of exclusive purchase or sale.
Article 105. Existing Holding Companies.
Separate order shall provide for the dissolution or. other disposition of
existing holding companies.
Article 106. Northeast Development Company, Ltd.
The Northeast Development Company (Tohoku Kabushiki Kaisha) shall
be exempt from the provisions of this law relating to the prohibition of
holding companies and intercorporate ownership of stocks and debentures.
Article 107. Existing Intercorporate Ownership of Stocks and Debentures.
Special order shall provide for the disposal of existing stocks and de-
bentures owned by non-financial companies in contravention of Articles 10
and 12 at the time the latter provisions go into effect.
Article 108. Existing Stocks and Debentures Ouned by Financial Institu-
tions.
Special order shall provide for the disposal of existing stocks and de-
bentures owned by financial institutions in violation of Articles 11 and 12
at the time the latter provisions go into effect.
Article 109. Resignation from Multiple Directorships.
Every person holding offices or directorships in competing or other
companies in contravention of Article 13 shall within a period of ninety (90)
days from the effective date thereof resign such position as may be neces-
sary to conform to the provisions of that Article.
Article 110. Disposition of Stocks Owned in Competing Companies.
Separate orders shall provide for the disposal of existing stocks owned
by a person in competing companies or otherwise in contravention of Article
14 at the time the provisions of that Article go into effect.
Article 111. Additional Penalties.
Criminal penalties are provided for violation of the provision of Article
109 relating to resignation of offices or directorships, or violation of orders
of the Fair Trade Commission under Articles 104, 105, 107 and 108 directing
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corrective action against control organizations or holding companies, or
requiring the disposal of stocks and debentures owned by financial and other
companies.
Article 112. Dual Liability of Corporations and Their Responsible Repre-
sentatives.
Corporations and their responsible employees or representatives shall
both be liable for violations of orders of the Fair Trade Commission under
Articles 104, 105, 107 and 108.
Article 113. Attendance at Meetings of the Holding Company Liquidation
Commission.
Members of the Fair Trade Commission may attend and express their
views at meetings of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission.
Article 114. Termns of Office of Original Commissioners.
The terms of office of the first panel of Commissioners shall be one (1)
year for one (1) Commissioner, two (2) years for two (2) Commissioners,
three (3) years for one (1) Commissioner, four (4) years for two (2)
Commissioners, and five (5) years for one (1) Commissioner, respectively.
